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THE SECURED PARTY MADE
WHOLE-EXPENSES, ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
DETERMINATION OF THE INDEBTEDNESS
UNDER U.C.C. § 9-504(1)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code' has been
hailed as one of the most innovative structurings of consensual
secured transactions in modem times. 2 Unlike Article Two,
which relies heavily on common-law supplementation, 3 Article
Nine is largely self-contained and self-explanatory.' But despite this laudatory character, a number of problems still linger
for the practitioner.5 One problem area which has received little judicial or scholarly attention until fairly recently is subsection 9-504(1).' This provision allows a secured party, upon the
1. All references are to the 1972 version of the Code unless otherwise noted. See
generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCILL CODE (1972).
2. W. DAVENPORT & R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS-i' (Foreword1966). PreCode law has been described as
a jerry-built, overlapping, fractured and confused structure of judicial policy,
common law rules, and legislative enactments, almost every one of which sprang
from a different economic era in answer only to one particular need, which need
was either peculiar to that era or to the needs of a special interest group.
Davis, The Law of Secured Transactionsand Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 6 S.D.L. REv. 173, 175-76 (1961).
3. See, e.g., Edwards, ContractFormation Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 61 MARQ. L. REv. 215 (1977).
4. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1075 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as 2 GMoRE].
5. See, e.g., Anzivino, When Does a Debtor Have Rights in the Collateral Under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code? 61 MARQ. L. REv. 23 (1977).
6. U.C.C. § 9-504(1) reads:
The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the order following to
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale or lease,
selling, leasing and the like and, to the extent provided for in the agreement and
not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred
by the secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest under
which the disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security interest in the collateral if written notification of demand therefor is received before
distribution of the proceeds is completed. If requested by the secured party, the
holder of a subordinate security interest must seasonably furnish reasonable
proof of his interest, and unless he does so, the secured party need not comply
with his demand.
This comment will not consider subsection (c) and will be confined to nonconsumer
transactions.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:449

debtor's default, to recover the reasonable expenses incurred in
repossessing and selling the collateral7 and guides the application of the proceeds to the indebtedness.8 This comment will
examine some of the difficulties encountered in applying 9504(1) and will suggest possible legal and practical solutions.
As a final note, the effect of an acceleration clause and determination of interest charges on the amount of indebtedness will
be reviewed.
II.

EXPENSES UNDER 9-504(1)(a)

Subsection (1)(a) is not new to the law of secured transactions; the Code replaced two other uniform laws which contained similar provisions. The absence of case law construing
the predecessors of 9-504(1)(a) would seem to indicate that
those sections posed few, if any, problems for parties who had
entered into security agreements.' ° Similarly, litigation under
the Code provision has only begun to surface within the last
several years. Much of the recent controversy has centered
around three basic issues. First, what types of expenses may a
secured party deduct? Secondly, are there any limits on the
amount of deductible expenses? Finally, may a secured party
recover expenses prior to or without resale of the collateral?
The discussion in this section will examine the judicial treat7. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a).
8. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(b).
9. See note 6 supra. See also 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, at 1201. See generally R.
HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 10-12 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HENSON].
10. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act [hereinafter cited as U.C.S.A.] was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1918 and was subsequently adopted by ten states. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act
[hereinafter cited as U.T.R.A.] was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1933 and was subsequently adopted by thirtytwo states. R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 18
(1974). The comparable provisions of the U.C.S.A. and the U.T.R.A. read as follows:
The proceeds of the resale shall be applied (1) to the payment of the expenses
thereof, (2) to the payment of the expenses of retaking, keeping and storing the
goods, (3) to the satisfaction of the balance due under the contract. Any sum
remaining after the satisfaction of such claims shall be paid to the buyer.
U.C.S.A. § 21.
The proceeds of any such sale, whether public or private, shall be applied
(1) to the payment of the expenses thereof, (2) to the payment of the expenses
of retaking, keeping and storing the goods, documents or instruments, to the
satisfaction of the trustee's indebtedness. The trustee shall receive any surplus
and shall be liable to the entruster for any deficiency.
U.T.R.A. § 6.
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ment of these problems and will propose some practical and
legal solutions.
A. Allowable Expenses
Courts have generally had little difficulty in deciding what
expenses qualify as costs incurred in "retaking, holding, preparing for sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like . . .""
Examples of allowable expenses include: private investigator's
fees, 12 insurance premiums, 3 lost profits'4 and incidental dam ages.' 5 On the other hand, payments to senior lienholders" and
fees of a private investigator for surveillance of the collateral
prior to resale' 7 have been disallowed. Unfortunately, however,
the courts have offered little more than a rote and often arbitrary recital of what expenses are or are not allowable. The
broad, and seemingly important, phrase "and the like" has
remained largely undefined. The only conclusion that can be
made, then, is that the courts have promulgated no rule for
determining whether a particular expense may properly be
deducted by a secured party.
B. Reasonable Expenses
The important question concerning the amount of recoverable expenses has been greatly obfuscated by the Code's requirement that such expenses be reasonable.' 8 Since the Code offers
no guidelines for determining whether an expense is reasonable, resort must be made to judicial definitions. The courts,
perhaps not unexpectedly, have offered a number of divergent
treatments of the reasonableness requirement.
One court has dealt with the reasonableness requirement by
11. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a).
12. Judd v. Heitman, 402 F. Supp. 929 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
13. Id.
14. White Motor Corp. v. Northland Ins. Co., 315 F. Supp. 689 (D.S.D. 1970). The
result is consistent with U.C.C. § 9-504(i)(a) which makes the resale of the collateral
subject to the Article 2 provisions on sales. See also U.C.C. § 2-708.
15. See note 14 supra.
16. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Tectamer, Inc., 33 N.C. App. 604, 235 S.E.2d 894
(1977). See also U.C.C. § 9-504(i)(c), note 6 supra, which allows the secured party to
repay junior lienholders from the proceeds.
17. Judd v. Heitman, 402 F. Supp. 929 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
18. U.C.C. § 1-102 does not allow the parties to vary the reasonableness requirement; however, they may determine the standards for performance. They may also
vary other provisions of the Code unless the specific section prohibits variance. See
note 39 infra.
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specifically failing to consider it. In Brownstein v. Fiberonics
Industries,Inc., 9 the secured party was allowed to recover over
$4000 in transportation, labor and equipment expenses. 2 The
court, however, gave no indication of whether it (1) made an
initial adjudication that the costs were reasonable and therefore allowable, (2) equated allowable with reasonable or (3)
completely failed to judicially review the expenses in light of
the reasonableness requirement of subsection (1) (a).
In United States v. Gore,2, expenses of approximately $1000
were found to be reasonable when $1900 was received from the
resale of the collateral. Generally, courts have disregarded the
ratio between the amount of expenses allowed and the amount
received upon resale of the collateral. Although this view is
somewhat surprising in light of the generally restrictive judicial
attitude with respect to the awarding of expenses to the secured party,2 it should be noted that Gore is apparently the
only case in which a debtor has expressly argued that expenses
were disproportionate to the amount of resale proceeds. Thus,
it would be unwise for future debtors to perfunctorily dismiss
the ratio argument of reasonable expenses.
In Cornett v. White Motors Corp., 2 the Nebraska Supreme
Court used the reasonableness requirement to create an inference which shifted the burden of proof of what amount of expenses were reasonable from the secured party to the debtor.
Although the secured party had not introduced any evidence
to show reasonableness, the court held that the burden of proof
had been met since the "value may be reasonably inferred
. . . . "The
debtor's failure to offer proof that the expenses
were unreasonable was thus dispositive of the issue. However, creation of an inference of reasonableness by shifting
the burden to the debtor would seem to be contrary to the
19. 110 N.J. Super. 43, 264 A.2d 262 (1970).
20. Id. at , 264 A.2d at 267-68.
21. 437 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
22. See Davis v. Small Business Inv. Co., 535 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976);
Housatonic Tractor Corp. v. Kamins, 50 App. Div. 2d 586, 375 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1975).
But cf. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Castiglione, 142 N.J. Super. 90, 360 A.2d 418
(1976) (amount of attorneys' fees found unconscionable in relation to the deficiency
awarded).
23. 190 Neb. 496, 209 N.W.2d 341 (1973).
24. Id. at
, 209 N.W.2d at 344.
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general rule under 9-504 which imposes the burden to prove
reasonableness on the secured party. 5
In addition to the issue of what amount of expenses are
reasonable, a collateral issue arising under subsection (1)(a)'
is whether the secured party may collect expenses without
proof of payment or without incurring such costs. One court has
allowed the secured party to collect reasonable expenses without proof of payment, based on the tort theory of recovery that
expenses, as damages, need not be actual (i.e., loss of earning
capacity without regard to lost wages) in order to be recoverable.2 The language of 9-504(1)(a) can be construed as lending
support for the tort-theory result. The clause, "the reasonable
attorneys' fees and legal expenses, 2 8 is modified by the word
"incurred." If the modifier "incurred" goes only to the clause
on attorneys' fees, the tort-theory result could be justified since
expenses would not have to be "incurred" to be awarded. Thus,
a secured party could presumably recover any of the expenses
enumerated in subsection (1)(a) so long as they would have
been reasonable under the circumstances.
The tort theory, however, seems contrary to the policy underlying the Code as indicated by section 1-106, which states
that one of the purposes of the Code is to make the parties
whole, or put them in the position they would have been in had
the agreement matured before default, after full performance.2 9
The tort theory of recovery suggests that the secured party may
reap a windfall if he can keep his expenses to a minimum,
without violating the commercially reasonable resale standard
set out in subsection 9-504(3).30 Allowing the secured party to
reap a windfall is also inconsistent with subsection 9-504(2),31
which requires, in most instances, that the secured party ac25. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 44.5.
26. U.C.C. § 9-504.
27. Wilson Leasing Co. v. Seaway Pharmacal Corp., 53 Mich. App. 359, 220
N.W.2d 83 (1974).
28. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a).
29. "The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end
that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had
fully performed .... " U.C.C. § 1-106(1).
30. "Sale or other disposition. . . must be commercially reasonable." U.C.C. § 9-

504(3).
31. "If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable
for any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel
paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the
security agreement so provides." U.C.C. § 9-504(2).
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count to the debtor for any surplus and which allows the secured party to collect a deficiency from the debtor. Subsection
9-504(2) is also in accord with the policy in section 1-106 to put
the parties in the position they would have attained had full
performance occurred. Finally, under a literal reading of 9-504,
it is difficult to comprehend how an expense can be reasonable
before it has been incurred.
C. Recovery of Expenses Before Resale
In regard to the third issue presented at the beginning of
this section-whether the secured party may recover expenses
prior to or without resale of the collateral-the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in an action based upon a promissory note underlying a security agreement, has held that the secured party
may only recover expenses upon resale or liquidation of the
collateral.3 2 In Brownstein, however, the court took a contrary
position under a somewhat different factual setting. The court
there, without articulating its rationale, allowed addition of
expenses to the debt before resale had occurred. 3 This procedure appears to be contrary to 9-504(1)(a), which allows the
secured party to deduct his expenses from the proceeds of a
resale.3 4 Certainly, it is arguable that there can be no proceeds
unless the collateral is resold. Section 9-505,35 which allows the
secured party to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt,
supports the deduction rather than the addition procedure"
since it does not specifically authorize the recovery of expenses
when the secured party has elected not to resell.3 1 Obviously,
if resale does occur, use of the deduction rather than the addition procedure will have no net effect on the amount of indebt32. Kohlenberg v. American Plumbing Supply Co., 82 Wis. 2d 384, 263 N.W.2d 496
(1978).
33. 110 N.J. Super. 43, 264 A.2d 262 (1970). This situation would most likely occur
when the secured party brings an action to collect the balance due rather than enforce
his rights through repossession. The secured party could then purchase the collateral
at the sheriff's sale and later attempt to resell the collateral to satisfy the judgment.
A Brownstein situation may also occur when a third party, such as a corporate receiver
or trustee in bankruptcy, is trying to claim the collateral by priority and a judicial
proceeding is necessary to adjudicate who should receive the collateral and resell it.
34. See note 6 supra.
35. "A secured party in possession may, after default, propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation." U.C.C. § 9-505(2).
36. But see 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, at 1199.
37. See discussion of the variance of Code provisions in note 18 supra and note 39
infra.
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edness. But, use of the addition practice could result in a lawsuit by the debtor to recoup expenses paid to the secured party
where the secured party ultimately elected to retain the collateral.
D. PracticalSolutions
To avoid some of the aforementioned problems, it is the
suggestion of this author that in drafting a security agreement
the parties enumerate, depending on the nature of the collateral, specific expenses that could be anticipated upon default,
repossession and resale in addition to those set out in subsection (1)(a).38 For example, in a security agreement covering an
aircraft, the secured party may want to insert a provision covering the cost of pilots' fees and fuel necessary to bring the
collateral into the possession of the secured party, especially
considering the mobility of the collateral and the distance between the location of the collateral and the secured party's
place of business. While it is not contended that such provisions are absolutely necessary to protect the secured party,
they are desirable and consistent with subsections 1-102(3) and
(4),31 which allow the parties to vary the provisions of the Code,
including the standards by which reasonableness is determined, absent a specific prohibition to the contrary.
IH.

AToRNEYs'FEES UNDER 9-504(1)(a)

At common law a prevailing litigant was not entitled to
recover his attorneys' fees from his unsuccessful adversary. 0 As
recently as 1975, the United States Supreme Court has found
the common-law prohibition to be the "American Rule."'" The
38. See note 6 supra.
39. (3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement,
except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be
disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such
standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
(4) The presence in certain provisions of this Act of the words "unless
otherwise agreed" or words of similar import does not imply that the effect of
other provisions may not be varied by agreement under subsection (3).
U.C.C. § 1-102 (emphasis added).
40. See generally E. WEEKS, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, (2d ed. 1892); Note,
Reimbursement for Attorneys' Fees From the Beneficiaries of Representative
Litigation, 58 MINN. L. REv. 933, 933-34 (1974).
41. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
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law of contracts, however, provides an exception to the general
rule in cases where the parties have specifically agreed on the
awarding of attorneys' fees.42 This exception has been codified
by 9-504(1) (a), which states that the secured party may deduct
from the proceeds of the resale his attorneys' fees "to the extent
provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by law
. ... ', While the inclusion in the security agreement of a
clause providing for the recovery of attorneys' fees is essential,
it is but a basic step which merely places the parties within the
ambit of 9-504(1)(a). Once it is determined that the Code
subsection applies, a number of subsequent issues may affect
the ultimate recovery by the secured party. Those to be examined in this discussion include: (1) Can either party recover
attorneys' fees? (2) When will local law inconsistent with the
Code preclude recovery? and (3) How is the amount of recovery
delimited by the Code's reasonableness requirement? As was
the case with the two uniform laws which preceded the Code,44
and, as is implied by the phrase "to the extent. . not prohibited by law . . .," the resolution of the above problems may
depend on local, common or statutory law which modifies, supplements or supersedes the Code. 4 Finally, this section will
suggest some practical drafting tips which may help alleviate
these difficulties.
A. Who May Recover Expenses
Although 9-504(1) (a) only provides for recovery of a secured
party's expenses, several states have statutes which allow either party to recover attorneys' fees when the agreement contains such a provision for one of the parties. Construing an
Oregon statute5 of this type, the court in Webster v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp.,47 held that because the secured
party-seller was entitled to fees under the agreement and
subsection (1)(a), the debtor could be awarded his attorneys'
fees where he prevailed in an action to collect a resale surplus.
42. 5 Com3n, CoNTRACTs § 1037 (1964).
43. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a). See also Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Hatton,
429 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Hopkins v. West Publishing Co., 106 Ga. App. 596,
127 S.E.2d 849 (1962).
44. See note 10 supra.
45. See In re American Beef Packers, 548 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1977); U.C.C. § 1103.
46. ORE. Rxv. STAT. § 20.096(1) (1977).
47. 267 Ore. 304, 516 P.2d 1275 (1973).
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While this result is not specifically permitted by the Code,
subsection (1) (a) does provide that the agreement governs the
award. The Oregon statute merely injected an additional term
into the agreement. Thus, the result in Webster is within the
bounds of section 9-504.
In First Westside National Bank v. Llera,48 the Montana
Supreme Court, construing a statute similar to that in
Webster,4 refused to allow recovery of attorneys' fees by the coowners of collateral on the ground that they were not parties
to the agreement. Similarly, in Centennial State Bank v.
S.E.K. ConstructionCo., 50 an assignee of the secured party was
denied recovery of attorneys' fees because such fees had not
accrued at the time of the assignment. These decisions are
demonstrative of a general judicial reluctance to award attorneys' fees and imply that only those who are parties to the
agreement will be allowed to recover such expenses.
B.

Local Law

Another issue with respect to the awarding of attorneys' fees
is whether local laws which conflict with 9-504(1)(a) can preclude recovery of such expenses. In In re American Beef
Packers5 ' the Nebraska common law was construed to prohibit
an award of attorneys' fees: "The courts of Nebraska for many
years have followed the principle that the recovery of attorneys'
fees will be permitted only where the state legislature has expressly provided by statute that an award of such fees may be
made by the court."5 The Eighth Circuit, construing this rule
in conjunction with the comments 3 to the Code, found no intention on the part of the legislature to change the commonlaw rule. Citing the district court, the court of appeals stated:
"'Notably, the comments to this section make no mention of
a change in the state law relative to attorneys' fees. The Court
cannot envision such a sweeping change in the state law by
such innocuous phraseology as found in § 9-504(1)(a).' ,5" The
Eighth Circuit also accepted the district court's -holding that
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

580 P.2d 100 (Mont. 1978).
MoNT. Rav. CODES ANN. 93-8601.1 (1947).
518 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. App. 1974).
548 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 247.
See comments to U.C.C. § 9-504.
548 F.2d at 248.
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subsection (1)(a) allows recovery of fees only where recognized
by state law.
The court in American Beef Packers, however, seems to
have ignored the obvious question of why the Nebraska legislature, in adopting the Code, included the language on attorneys'
fees in light of the strict common-law prohibition. The answer
is unascertainable from the language of the subsection or the
comments. Instead, the result seems to be attributable to the
approach taken by the court of appeals in requiring fees to be
specifically recognized by law rather than prohibited by law,
as the language in subsection (1)(a) suggests. The opposite
result could just as easily have been justified by construing the
language in the subsection to be permissive, or a recognition of
a change in the common-law prohibition. At least one case has
so held.
The Michigan Court of Appeals in Wilson Leasing Co. v.
Seaway Pharmacal Corp.5" overruled the trial court's holding
that an award of attorneys' fees was contrary to Michigan public policy. The trial court based its ruling on a Michigan statute which provided that attorneys' fees could be taxed as costs
up to the amount of $50 unless additional sums were authorized by statute or court rule. The court of appeals found that
section 9-504 authorized additional sums and remanded the
case to the trial court for a determination of reasonable attorneys' fees. This case lends support for the conclusion that the
court in American Beef Packers erred, and that the provisions
in 9-504 can be read as permissive in nature where other statutes or case law hold to the contrary.5 7
C. Reasonable Attorneys' Fees Under 9-504(1)(a)8
As has already been noted, the general common-law proscription against the recovery of attorneys' fees is qualified to
the extent that the parties have specifically agreed on the recovery of such expenses. In cases where attorneys' fees have
been allowed, the courts have generally required the award to
55. 53 Mich. App. 359, 220 N.W.2d 83 (1974).
56. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.2405(6) (1967).
57. See text following note 64 infra.
58. See note 6 supra. See generally Boyd, The Revised Uniform Consumer Credit
Code as a Replacement for Piecemeal Consumer Legislation, 18 ARiz. L. REv. 1, 13
(1976); Teofan, Commercial Transactions, 25 Sw. L.J. 74, 86 (1971).
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be reasonable.-9 Some of the objective criteria considered by
the courts in making this determination include
the amount and character of the services rendered, the labor,
the time, and trouble involved, the character and importance
of the litigation, the amount of money or value of the property
affected, the professional skill and experience called for, and
the standing of the attorney in his profession; to which may
be added the general ability of the client to pay and the
pecuniary benefit derived from the services. 0
Since the Code does not define the term "reasonable," any
definition will have to be provided by common-law rules such
as the one above. Unfortunately, Code decisions have shown
little consistency in construing the reasonableness requirement.
An important, but as of yet unresolved question is whether
and to what extent the objective criteria of reasonableness can
be modified by specific provision in the security agreement.
The agreement in GeneralElectric CreditCorp. v. Castiglione61
provided that the secured party would receive
as reasonable attorneys' fees twenty (20%) percent of the rent
then remaining unpaid or [sic] the fair market value of the
Vehicle(s) at the time Lessor declared Lessee in default,
whichever is greater, if such attorneys' fees are permitted by
law, or 2if prohibited by law, such lesser sum as may be permitted.

Although the language of the agreement suggests that the parties were stipulating that twenty percent of the balance was a
reasonable amount, 3 the court refused to accept this possibility-resorting, instead, to a curious interpretation of fact and
an inconsistent application of law.
The facts in Castiglione indicate that the balance at the
time of default amounted to $34,614.38, and therefore, attorneys' fees of $6,922.88 were deducted from the proceeds of resale as the greater amount, since the fair market value of the
59. Herro, McAndrews & Porter, S.C. v. Gerhardt, 62 Wis. 2d 179, 214 N.W.2d 401
(1974); Glynn v. Cascade State Bank, 227 Iowa 932, 289 N.W. 722 (1940).
60. Touchett v. E Z Paintr Corp., 14 Wis. 2d 479, 488, 111 N.W.2d 419, 423 (1961)
(citing Estate of Huffman, 349 Pa. 59, 64, 36 A.2d 640, 643 (1944)). See alsoABA Code
of Professional Responsibility No. 2, EC2-18 and DR2-106(B) (1978).
61. 142 N.J. Super. 90, 360 A.2d 418 (1976).
62. Id. at _,
360 A.2d at 425.
63. See note 18 supra.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:449

collateral, a truck, at the time of default was $16,000.00 and
would have yielded only $3,200.00 in attorneys' fees. The court,
in an action for a deficiency judgment against the debtor,
based the determination of the deficiency on the truck's fair
market value, which was considerably less than the amount
due on the note, and awarded $57.00 to the secured party as
still owing from the debtor. Stating that the amount involved
or awarded in the litigation, as well as the results obtained
should be considered in determining reasonableness, the court
found that the fees resulting from a calculation of twenty percent of the unpaid balance or fair market value as the agreement provided, would be unconscionable. 4 Instead, the court
made a final award of twenty percent of the deficiency, or
$11.40. However, the court was quick to point out that the
award did not "reflect upon the quality of services rendered
"65

The decision in Castiglione can perhaps best be explained
as an extreme example of judicial picking and choosing to attain a desired result which reflects a general antipathy with
respect to the awarding of attorneys' fees. This explanation of
the result is readily demonstrated by the court's distortion of
law and contract. While purporting to follow the objective test
for determining reasonableness, the court, in fact, adopted
some criteria (amount involved and result obtained) but yet
found other factors (quality of the services) to be irrelevant.
Importantly, had the court fully adhered to the objective
common-law criteria mentioned earlier, the award would almost certainly have been far greater than $11.40. Notably, the
factors selected were those which had a minimizing effect on
the amount of the award; conversely, those rejected would have
had a maximizing effect.
The court in Castiglione afforded a similar treatment to the
security agreement, finding unconscionable those provisions
which would have maximized the award, but yet retaining the
20% provision. Had the court rejected the contractual provision
in its entirety the award would certainly have exceeded $11.40,
since the court would then have been constrained to apply the
objective criteria listed earlier. Moreover, the court in such a
case would not have been able to pick some factors while reject64. 142 N.J. Super. at
65. Id. at n.8.

-,

360 A.2d at 425.
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ing others, since this selectivity was, to a large extent, attributable to the validity; and subject to the modification of at least
a part of the contractual provision (i.e., the 20% clause). Also,
had the court accepted the entire contractual provision the
award would have been almost $7,000.00. Thus, it is apparent
that had the court fully applied the objective criteria of reasonableness, rejected the entire contractual provision or accepted
the entire provision the award would have greatly exceeded
$11.40. The only other alternative, then, was to do exactly what
the court in fact chose to do-adopt those facets of law and the
contract which would minimize the award. Such judicial
straining can only be explained by a general reluctance and
disfavor to award attorneys' fees.
As a result of its piecemeal analysis, the court in Castiglione
failed to resolve the issue concerning the relationship between
the objective test of reasonableness and any specific provisions
in the agreement. While it is arguable that any amount stipulated in the agreement is one which the parties considered to
be reasonable, the better view, and one which is apparently
supported by the language of 9-504(1)(a), is that the amount
must be reasonable independent of any contractual provision.
This does not mean, however, that the contract amount should
be disregarded. Instead, courts should initially determine
whether the contract amount is reasonable, giving deference to
the principle of "freedom of contract" and standards set out in
the agreement. Where this amount is found to be unreasonable,
courts should invalidate the entire clause, rather than only
certain "unconscionable" parts, and base the award on the
objective common-law criteria listed earlier. Such a procedure
would avoid, to some extent, the overt judicial manipulation
and subjective interjection which was apparent in Castiglione.
In cases where the agreement merely provides for the recovery of "reasonable" attorneys' fees and does not specify any
amount, the results have been somewhat startling in light of
the objective test of reasonableness. For example, in John
6 6 relying on language in the security
Deere Co. v. Catalano,
agreement calling for "'all expenses of collection by suit or
otherwise, including reasonable attorney's fees,' "" the court
found that an award of $1500 in attorneys' fees based on a
66. 186 Colo. 101, 525 P.2d 1153 (1974).
67. Id. at

-,

525 P.2d at 1154.
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$1300 deficiency judgment was not unreasonable as a matter
of law. An even more stunning example of the Catalano view
is an award of 33 1/3 percent of the deficiency in attorneys' fees
where the security agreement provided for reasonable fees. 8
These decisions cannot be reconciled with the proposition in
Castiglione that the relationship between the amount due and
the fees claimed is one of the factors to be considered in the
reasonableness determination. Thus, even in cases where the
agreement fails to specify a particular amount, the determination of allowable attorneys' fees is likely to be confused by
inconsistent applications of the objective common-law criteria
of reasonableness.
A somewhat collateral issue is whether the secured party
may recover attorneys' fees for services rendered in prosecuting
a counterclaim. In Whitson v. Yaffe Iron and Metal Corp., 9 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals awarded attorneys' fees to the
secured party based on a counterclaim for repossession where
the action was brought by the debtor. The court found
"adequate support"70 for its holding in section 9-504.71 In A to
Z Rentals, Inc. v. Wilson,7 2 however, the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals reached an opposite result in a somewhat different
context. The court refused to award fees to the secured party
for defending against a counterclaim brought by the debtor for
wrongful repossession and damages. When read in conjunction,
these cases seem to stand for the proposition that a secured
party can recover attorneys' fees incurred in litigating a repossession claim but not for defending against a claim of wrongful
repossession.
D. PracticalSolutions
State law, apart from the Code, plays an important role in
determining who can recover legal expenses and to what extent
fees can be awarded. Subsection 9-504(1)(a) has only a small
part in guiding the practitioner, especially in states where there
are restrictions or other limits on recovery of fees. It is therefore
imperative that the practitioner be conscious of any state law
or rule concerning fees. This author has no all-inclusive solu68. Judd v. Heitman, 402 F. Supp. 929 (M.D. Tenn. 1975). However, the court did
not indicate the actual amount of the fees. Id.
69. 385 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1967).
70. Id. at 170.
71. See note 6 supra.
72. 413 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1969).
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tions to the problems presented other than to suggest that the
security agreement be prudently drafted, so as to avoid shocking the consciences of jurists by requests for huge fees in routine
cases involving small sums of money; flat percentages are particularly vulnerable to that type of attack. Perhaps the potential problem of unreasonableness can be alleviated by including criteria as to what considerations should be taken into account in determining the fee.
IV.

DETERMINATION OF THE INDEBTEDNESS UNDER

9-504(1)(b) 7 3

In order to determine the respective positions of the parties
as to a deficiency or a surplus, as well as the rights of junior
lienholders under 9-504(1) (c), it is imperative to determine the
exact amount of the indebtedness still unsatisfied. Acceleration clauses, and their effect on interest payments, play an
important role in determining who owes what to whom and how
much. Through the operation of an acceleration clause,74 the
entire obligation, both principal and interest,75 becomes payable in full upon default or other stipulated occurrence or when
the secured party deems himself insecure. 8 The question arises, however, as to whether the secured party may include,
upon acceleration, unaccrued interest or finance charges as
part of the indebtedness. The Code is silent on this matter."
In the recent case of Credit Alliance Corp. v. Adams Construction Corp.,7 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that "to
allow recovery of unaccrued interest or finance charges . . .
would be clearly unconscionable."79 The court stressed that one
of the reasons for its holding was the fact that the debtor could
receive a partial refund of the finance charges on prepayment.
Unconscionability, however, is only one of several grounds the
courts have used to prevent recovery of unaccrued interest;
73. See note 6 supra. See also 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, § 43.4.
74. Generally, acceleration may not occur in the absence of a term in the agreement. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Castiglione, 142 N.J. Super. 90, 360 A.2d 418
(1976).
75. 2 GiLMORE, supra note 4, at 1195-96. However, Professor Gilmore also suggests
that acceleration applies only to the principal balance and not the interest. Id.
76. The Code imposes a good faith requirement on "insecurity" accelerations, also
called accelerations at will. U.C.C. § 1-208. See also 2 GILMORE, supra note 4, at 1197.
77. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 49 (1941).
78. 570 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1978).
79. Id. at 286.
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others include lack of consideration,"0 usurious interest rates,"1
unenforceable penalty" and unenforceable liquidated damages."
Accepting the general rule that unaccrued interest charges
are not recoverable by the secured party," the question arises
as to when such charges cease accruing. Several points in the
default procedure could be utilized to measure the interest due
upon acceleration; they include: (1) default, 5 (2) repossession
of the collateral, (3) sale of the collateral or (4) entry of a
deficiency judgment. Two courts have suggested different
points at which interest charges cease accruing: (1) when payment from resale is received, 8 and (2) until the time the secured party accelerates the debt upon default. 7 The better
view seems to be that interest accrues until the secured party
receives payment, based on the time-value concept of money.
This view is also in accord with the general practice of charging
interest on judgments until they are satisfied."
The solution to some of the problems posed in this section
is to include an acceleration clause in every security agreement
and insert terms to allow interest or finance charges to accrue
until the principal, and interest to the date of payment, have
been satisfied. In addition, it certainly would not be unwise to
provide for accrual of both prejudgment and post-judgment
interest on any deficiency, as well as a term providing for compounded interest. 9 Also, to better equalize the position of the
parties, a provision awarding interest to the debtor on a surplus
may be desirable to make the agreement less susceptible to
judicial invalidation.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Walker v. Temple Trust Co., 124 Tex. 575, 80 S.W.2d 935 (1935).
Lewis v. Termplan, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 507, 184 S.E.2d 473 (1971).
Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. App. 1972).
A-Z Serv. Center, Inc. v. Segall, 334 Mass. 672, 138 N.E.2d 266 (1956).
See text accompanying notes 84-89 infra.

85. Default is not defined in the Code; its definition is left to the agreement between the parties. HENSON, supra note 9, § 10-2 (1973).
86. In re Schrader Body, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Pa. 1970); White Motor
Corp. v. Northland Ins. Co., 315 F. Supp. 689 (D.S.D. 1970).
87. Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. App. 1972).
88. White Motor Corp. v. Northland Ins. Co., 315 F. Supp. 689 (D.S.D. 1970). See
also Wis. STAT. § 814.04 (1975) which adds seven percent interest to judgments until
they are satisfied.
89. Compounded interest on the unpaid balance was permitted in Wilson Leasing
Co. v. Seaway Pharmacal Corp., 53 Mich. App. 359, 220 N.W.2d 83 (1974).
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In cases where a debtor owes more than one obligation to
the secured party a possible question is whether proceeds attributable to one debt may be apportioned among the several
obligations. In J.J. Fowler, Inc. v. Fulton National Bank, 1
where a corporation and individual defaulted, the court allowed the secured party to apply the proceeds of resale of
pledged securities to both the corporate and individual debt.
This result is consistent with 9-504(1) because the collateral
had been pledged under both security agreements and was presumably sold on account of both the individual and corporate
debts. More importantly, however, it apparently would not
have been inconsistent for the secured party to have applied
the proceeds to only one of the debts and seek a judgment to
satisfy the remaining obligation. This option may be of considerable importance under certain circumstances. For example,
where one debtor is an individual and the other is the individual's corporation, and one of the debtors is insolvent, the secured party could apply the proceeds to the obligation of the
insolvent party and obtain a deficiency judgment against the
solvent debtor. Since the insolvent party will likely be discharged from all obligations, it would be fruitless for the secured party to obtain a deficiency judgment against this
debtor. The option of allocating the proceeds between the two
debts might, then, be of some importance to the secured
92
party.
A final question to be discussed is whether the order in
which the proceeds must be applied under 9-504(1)(a)-(c) can
be altered by agreement. More specifically, can the parties
agree that proceeds will be applied to the indebtedness before
they are applied to expenses? The Georgia Court of Appeals
has held that a security agreement stating that "'any balance
of such proceeds may be applied.

. .

in such order of applica-

90. See also W. DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 6.05(b)(5)
(1978) and note 6 supra.
91. 145 Ga. App. 220, 243 S.E.2d 642 (1978).
92. However, when multiple security agreements are executed to cover individual
lots or units of collateral, and the collateral is sold as a single unit, the value of the
proceeds should be proportioned according to the value of each security agreement,
and in absence of agreement to the contrary, the secured party has no discretion as to
the application. Wilson Leasing Co. v. Seaway Pharmacal Corp., 53 Mich. App. 359,
220 N.W.2d 83 (1974).
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tion, as the holder may from time to time elect' "9 was a waiver
of the requirements of subsection (1) as to the order specified
in that provision for the application of the proceeds. The decision was based on the application of subsection 1-102(3)" 4 to the
language of subsection 9-504(1), which does not indicate that
it may not be varied by the parties. By applying the precept
that "freedom of contract is a principle of the code,"" the
Georgia court cured any possible inconsistencies the decision
may have had concerning the question of whether the order of
application of the proceeds could be varied by agreement. In
the absence of agreement, however, the terms of subsection 9504(1) are mandatory."
In order to avoid disputes of this nature it would be advisable for secured parties to include provisions in their security
agreements to allow them to apply the proceeds of resale
against any obligation of the debtor or even to waive the order
of application requirements of (1) altogether. This should be
made clear so the secured party can apply the proceeds to any
of the debtor's obligations, even in situations where different
collateral is pledged under each agreement. 7
VI.

CONCLUSION

As innocuous as U.C.C. § 9-504(1) appears on its face, it can
present problems for drafters of security agreements and practitioners of commercial law. To recapitulate, the problems
posed by this Code provision include: (1) What types, and to
what extent are expenses of repossession recoverable? (2) What
are the limitations on the recovery of attorneys' fees? (3) How
is the amount of indebtedness affected by acceleration of interest charges? and (4) How do multiple obligations of one debtor
affect the application of proceeds from the disposition of the
collateral? As has been demonstrated, the answers to many of
these questions are less than clear.
The suggested means of resolving the problems posed
throughout this comment are by no means exhaustive, nor are
93. Atkins v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 127 Ga. App. 348, -, 193 S.E.2d 187,
188 (1972).
94. See note 39 supra.
95. U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 2.
96. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Tectamer, Inc., 33 N.C. App. 604, 235 S.E.2d 894
(1977).
97. See the discussion of this problem in note 92 supra.
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they a panacea for all that may beset the practitioner under
subsection 9-504(1), but it is hoped that these suggestions will
be helpful in alerting courts and attorneys to some of the problems which may arise under this Code subsection. There is one
lesson, however, that seems to ring clear, and that is that
"boilerplate" provisions should be avoided; innovative drafting, and drafting agreements ab initio in large transactions,
will hopefully prevent many clients and Code litigants from
encountering some of the many pitfalls inherent in subsection
9-504(1).
SusAN DA
sKEmSi

